October 6, 2026 by matray

An Illinois appellate court upheld a multimillion-dollar medical malpractice verdict, ruling that a patient’s catastrophic stroke and resulting legal disability tolled both the state’s two-year statute of limitations and four-year statute of repose. The court rejected the argument that the ability of the patient’s wife to sue on his behalf ended the tolling, finding that a representative’s ability to act does not remove the patient’s disability or start the statutory periods. 

Case: Chicago Trust Co. v. Cherukuri, No. 2021 L 007988, 09/18/2026, published.    

Facts: In February 2016, 64-year-old Craig Pierce was admitted to Saint Francis Hospital with pneumonia and sepsis. While hospitalized, he suffered an acute kidney injury. Doctors placed a catheter for short-term dialysis treatment.  

Pierce was also diagnosed with atrial fibrillation and prescribed a blood thinner, Coumadin, to prevent a stroke.  

After being discharged, Pierce continued dialysis at a facility operated by Fresenius Medical Care of Illinois LLC. When he finished dialysis treatment a few weeks later, Dr. Sudha Cherukuri,   

Fresenius’s medical director, referred him to the Renal Intervention Center to have the catheter removed.  

A few days before the procedure, an RIC employee called Pierce’s wife and said Pierce should stop taking Coumadin, which he did.  

Pierce then suffered a cerebral artery stroke. He was airlifted to an OSF Healthcare System hospital, where surgeons removed part of his skull to save his life.  

The stroke was catastrophic, causing extensive damage to Pierce’s brain and cognitive abilities.  

Procedural history: In 2020, Pierce’s wife filed a medical malpractice suit against Cherukuri, Fresenius, RIC, OSF, and others.  

OSF moved to dismiss based on the two-year statute of limitations and four-year statute of repose for medical malpractice claims.  

A trial judge denied the motion, ruling that the disability exception tolled the statutes of limitations and repose.  

A week after the probate court appointed the Chicago Trust Co. as temporary guardian of Pierce’s estate, it filed an amended complaint on Pierce’s behalf.  

In December 2023, the probate court deemed Pierce “a disabled person” and appointed his wife as the plenary guardian of his person and Chicago Trust as the plenary guardian of Pierce’s estate.  

After discovery and weeks before trial, OSF filed affirmative defenses again asserting the statutes of limitations and repose. The trial judge struck the affirmative defenses without stating its reasons.  

After a three-week trial, the jury returned a verdict for the Pierces against all defendants except Renal Intervention Center, which was found not liable. The jury awarded over $35 million to Pierce and $6 million to his wife.   

The judge granted an $11.5 million setoff against the award and added prejudgment interest on the full amount of the verdict before applying the setoff.  

Analysis: The Illinois Appellate Court said that a medical negligence action generally has to be filed within two years after the plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of the injury and its wrongful cause and, in all events, within four years after the act or omission giving rise to the claim.  

Legal disability tolls both the two-year limitations period and the four-year repose period, the court said.  

Here, OSF did not deny that Pierce had a legal disability after his stroke, but it argued neither limitations nor repose should be tolled because his wife had the ability to act on Pierce’s behalf.   

“A representative may sue on behalf of a disabled person, but the representative’s ability to sue neither removes the disability nor starts the statutory periods,” the court said. “Otherwise, the protection afforded a disabled person would depend on someone else’s diligence.”  

The court went on to uphold the judge’s calculation of prejudgment interest as well as the jury’s $4 million award for emotional distress and $4 million award for pain and suffering.  

While emotional distress is a component of “suffering,” the court said the equal amounts of the awards, standing alone, did not show that the jury compensated the same injury twice. 

Disposition: Affirmed.   

To read the court’s decision, click here.